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1 http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de >>
Entscheidungen >> 05.10.2004.
2 A eurocheque card is a cash card.
Electronic signature (PIN); ATM; card holder;
theft of card; subsequently used by thief;
liability
Savings Bank liability for abuse of an ec-card2
Prima facie evidence of the negligent storage of an ec-
card and PIN by the cardholder and the invalidation of
the evidence
1. If, after the theft of an ec-card, the card is used with
the correct personal identification number (PIN) at
an automated teller machine (ATM), in principle the
prima facie evidence demonstrates that the
cardholder must have noted the PIN on the card or
stored the PIN together with the card, if other
causes of fraud can be disregarded as the result of
the experience of life.
2. The possibility that unknown third parties can
obtain a personal identification number (PIN) by
eavesdropping may in principle only be considered
if the ec-card was stolen in a close chronological
sequence to the use of the PIN by the cardholder at
an ATM or a point-of-sale (PoS) terminal.
Tenor
The revision against the judgment of the 5th Civil
Chamber of the District Court (Landgericht) of
Duisburg, 8 May 2003 is rejected, and will be at the
expense of the plaintiff.
Facts of the case
1 The plaintiff demands the reimbursement of funds
debited by the defendant savings bank from the
plaintiff’s current account after withdrawals at
ATMs.
2 The plaintiff held a current account with the
defendant. In November 1999 the defendant issued
an ec-card and a personal identification number
(PIN) to the plaintiff. The defendant’s general terms
and conditions regarding the use of the ec-card
contained inter alia the following clauses:
3 ‘For damages, which occur before the loss is
reported; the account holder is liable if the
damages are the result of the account holder’s
violation of the duty of care and the duty of co-
operation.
...
4 Damages which occurred before the loss is
reported and which have to be accepted by the
account holder will be borne by the savings
bank provided that the cardholder did not
violate his duty of care and his duty of co-
operation with gross negligence.
5 Gross negligence of the cardholder is present,
in particular, if 
6 - the personal identification number is noted on
the ec-card or is stored together with the ec-
card (e.g., the original letter which contains the
PIN),
7 - the personal identification number was
communicated to another person and the abuse
was caused thereby ...’
8
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9 The ec-card of the plaintiff was successfully used at
the ATMs of two other savings banks by entering
the correct PIN. On 23 September 2000 at 17:30,
two amounts of 500 DM were withdrawn on two
separate occasions, and in the morning of the
following day, the sum of 1,000 DM was withdrawn.
On 25 September 2000 the plaintiff initiated the
blocking of her ec-card. The defendant charged the
plaintiff's current account with the amounts
withdrawn from the ATMs.
10 The plaintiff claims that on 23 September 2000,
between 15.00 and 17.00, during a city festival, her
purse which contained her ec-card was stolen. The
plaintiff claims that the PIN was noted nowhere, but
it was saved in the form of a telephone number on
her mobile telephone. The mobile telephone was
not stolen. The plaintiff claims that the thief must
have decrypted the personal identification number
or must have exploited a lack in the defendant’s
security system for the secrecy of the bank’s
cryptographic key.
11 The Local Court (Amtsgericht) decided in favour of
plaintiff’s demand of reimbursement of the amount
of 2,000 DM plus interest, and the District Court
(Landgericht) rejected the plaintiff’s demand. With
the revision admitted by the court of appeal, the
plaintiff seeks for the reinstatement of the District
Court’s judgment.
Findings
12 The revision is without cause.
I.
13 The District Court based its decision in essence on
the following:
14 The complaint is without cause. The plaintiff’s
current account was rightly charged with 2,000 DM
because of the plaintiff’s violation of the contract
regarding the current account. The plaintiff is liable
for damages to this amount. The prima facie
evidence that the plaintiff violated the duty of care
regarding the storage of the ec-card or the secrecy
of the personal identification number in a grossly
negligent way is in favour of the defendant. In
particular it has to be taken into consideration that
the plaintiff may have noted the personal
identification number on the ec-card or that the
plaintiff may have stored this number together with
the ec-card. Other than because of the plaintiff’s
grossly negligent behaviour, the three withdrawals
at an ATM without any failure when the PIN was
entered by an unauthorised third party (the thief or
an accomplice) may not be explained according to
life experience.
15 The PIN and the 128-BIT-key to the PIN-system of
the ec-card issued to the plaintiff by the defendants
in November 1999 could not be decrypted on 23
September 2000. According to the authorized
expert’s report it is mathematically impossible to
generate the PIN of an individual card by means of
information present on the card without prior
knowledge of the bank’s cryptographic key. Even
with maximum financial effort it would be
impossible to design a computer that allows the
calculation of the bank’s cryptographic key. Other
theoretic possibilities considered by the authorized
expert regarding the explanation how a delinquent
could have obtained the plaintiff’s PIN if the plaintiff
did not behave in a grossly negligent way would not
exclude a prima facie evidence to the plaintiff’s
detriment nor weaken the evidence. All theoretic
possibilities could not be considered as seriously
neither in general nor in the specific case. The
former applies to ‘insider attacks’, i.e. for attacks by
employees of the bank against the bank’s
cryptographic key, for attacks against the software
used for the authorization of transactions in the
bank’s data procession centre or unintended leaks
of the software allowing a withdrawal without
correct PIN or providing insiders the opportunity for
an attack. According to the explanations of the
expert, there is no evidence that such possibilities
have been discovered and exploited for such
criminal acts. Finally, in this case there was no
evidence that the plaintiff’s PIN was obtained by a
third party.
II.
16 These observations withstand a legal review.
17 The plaintiff is not entitled to claim pursuant to
Section 667, 675, Para 1, f Civil Code Section 676 or
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Section 700, Para 1, 607 BGB the reimbursement of
the amount of 2,000 DM withdrawn by an
unauthorized third party from the defendant. The
defendant lawfully debited the plaintiff’s account
with the amount of 2,000 DM originated by the cash
withdrawals on 23 and 24 September 2000 at ATMs.
18 1. […] The defendant has not proved that the
withdrawals of money were made by the plaintiff or
by a third party with the plaintiff’s consent. Rather,
the District Court reached the conclusion that the
cash withdrawals were made by an unauthorized
third party, namely the thief, or an accomplice with
the help of the original ec-card. This is not disputed
by the defence pleadings.
19 2. However the defendant is entitled to claim for
damages from the plaintiff, because of a default in
performance of contract. The defendant could
charge the damages to the plaintiff’s current
account (see BGHZ 84, 371, 376) and debit the
current account. The plaintiff is liable for the
damage resulting from the misuse of the ec-card
because the damage was caused by the plaintiff’s
grossly negligent violation of the duty of care and
the duty of co-operation. As a result, the District
Court correctly accepted the prima facie evidence
that the plaintiff violated the duty to keep the PIN
secret by noting the PIN on the ec-card or storing
the PIN together with the ec-card.
20 a) Noting the personal identification number on the
ec-card or storing it together with the ec-card
constitutes grossly negligent behaviour of the
cardholder, which is also pointed out in Section A.
III. 2.4 of the general conditions for the use of ec-
cards. The evaluation of this behaviour as grossly
negligent takes into account that this behaviour
undermines the special protection offered by the
PIN which is required in addition to the ec-card
because an unauthorised third party which
obtained the ec-card and PIN could withdraw
money without further ado (BGHZ 145, 337, 340 et
seq.).
21 b) The District Court concluded rightfully that the
prima facie evidence indicates that the plaintiff has
noted the personal identification number on the ec-
card or stored it together with the ec-card. The
plaintiff has not invalidated this prima facie
evidence. […]
26 (2) So far the Senate has left open whether in cases
in which cash was withdrawn at ATMs using the
correct personal identification number to withdraw
money, the prima facie evidence indicates that
either the cardholder as the legitimate account
holder himself has carried out the withdrawal or
that a third party could have obtained the PIN after
the theft of an ec-card because it was stored
together with it (BGHZ 145, 337, 342). Only the
latter comes into consideration as it remains an
undisputed finding of the District Court. In the case-
law of the courts of first instance and in the
literature, a respective prima facie evidence is
overwhelmingly approved to the detriment of the
account holder (OLG Frankfurt - 8. Zivilsenat - WM
2002, 2101, 2102 f.; OLG Stuttgart WM 2003, 125,
126 f.; LG Hannover WM 1998, 1123 f.; LG Stuttgart
WM 1999, 1934 f.; LG Frankfurt am Main WM 1999,
1930, 1932 f.; LG Darmstadt WM 2000, 911, 913 f.;
LG Köln WM 2001, 852, 853; LG Berlin - 52.
Zivilkammer - WM 2003, 128, 129; AG Diepholz WM
1995, 1919, 1920; AG Hannover WM 1997, 1207,
1208 f.; AG Wuppertal WM 1997, 1209; AG
Charlottenburg WM 1997, 2082; AG Dinslaken WM
1998, 1126; AG Osnabrück WM 1998, 1127, 1128; AG
Frankfurt am Main NJW 1998, 687 f. und BKR 2003,
514, 516; AG Flensburg VuR 2000, 131 f.; AG
Hohenschönhausen WM 2002, 1057, 1058 f.; AG
Regensburg WM 2002, 2105, 2106 f.; AG Nürnberg
WM 2003, 531, 532 f.; AG Charlottenburg WM 2003,
1174, 1175; Werner WM 1997, 1516;
Aepfelbach/Cimiotti WM 1998, 1218; Gößmann WM
1998, 1264, 1269; Palandt/Sprau, BGB 63. Aufl. §
676 h Rdn. 13; Musielak/Foerste, ZPO 3. Aufl. § 286
Rdn. 26), von einem erheblichen Teil aber verneint
(OLG Hamm WM 1997, 1203, 1206 f.; OLG Frankfurt -
7. Zivilsenat - WM 2001, 1898; OLG Frankfurt - 24.
Zivilsenat – WM 2002, 1055, 1056 f.; LG Berlin - 51.
Zivilkammer - WM 1999, 1920; LG Dortmund CR
1999, 556, 557; LG Mönchengladbach VuR 2001, 17,
18; LG Osnabrück WM 2003, 1951, 1953; AG Buchen
VuR 1998, 42 f.; AG Hamburg VuR 1999, 88, 89f.; AG
Berlin-Mitte VuR 1999, 201, 202 f. und EWiR 2003,
891; AG Frankfurt am Main WM 1999, 1922, 1924 ff.;
AG München NJW-RR 2001, 1056, 1057; AG
Dortmund BKR 2003, 912, 913; AG Essen BKR 2003,
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514; Pausch CR 1997, 174; Strube WM 1998, 1210,
1212 ff.; Zöller/Greger, ZPO 24. Aufl. vor § 284 Rdn
31). The vast majority of these decisions and
sources refer to the old procedure for the
generation and verification of the personal
identification numbers with the help of a private 56
bit bank key or pool key. This old procedure was
replaced in 1997 and therefore these decisions and
sources have only a reduced validity for the
evaluation of the security of the procedure after
1997. […]
27 (3) The District Court and the Senate agree that in
the present case the prima facie evidence argues for
the grossly negligent behaviour of the cardholder
concerning the secrecy of her personal
identification number.
28 (a) Contrary to the plaintiff’s opinion, the principles
of the prima facie evidence are not inapplicable for
the reason alone that there are several theoretical
and practical possibilities for a third party to obtain
the personal identification number. The District
Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the
withdrawal with the original ec-card and the correct
PIN by an unauthorised third party cannot be
explained other than with the grossly negligent
behaviour of the plaintiff. Other reasons might be
possible in theory but after an evaluation they have
to be considered as beyond the experience of life. 
29 (b) Against the application of the principles of the
prima facie evidence the plaintiff can not mention
that there is no empirical proof that the personal
identification number is noted on the ec-card or
stored together with the card. […]
30 (c) The District Court – taking into account the
authorized expert’s advice – has reached the
conclusion that even with the greatest financial
effort it is mathematically impossible to generate
the PIN of an individual card by means of
information present on the card without prior
knowledge of the 128 bit cryptographic key used by
the bank. This complies with written information of
the Federal Office for information security
(Bundesamt für die Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik – BSI) towards the German
savings banks and clearing house association
(Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband – DSGV)
dated 27 November 2001 regarding the new PIN-
procedure introduced by the association. […]
31 (d) The rules on the prima facie evidence are not
inapplicable because it would be assumed that two
different causes could have caused the damage,
both of them typical courses of action but the
plaintiff would only be liable in one case. […]
Eavesdropping of the PIN for instance by means of
optical or technical devices or by manipulation of
the ATM or by the attentive observation of the PIN
input at a Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminal or an ATM
without sufficient visual protection would be quite
conceivable. […] 
32 The plaintiff does not argue such a case. The
contrary was argued by the plaintiff, claiming that
she did not withdraw money with the ec-card the
day the card was stolen. […]
33 (e) Without an error of law, the District Court does
not attach importance to the ‘insider attacks’, i.e.
attacks by employees of the bank to spy out the
bank’s cryptographic key, attacks against the
software used for the authorization of transactions
in the bank’s data procession centre or unintended
leaks of this software, attacks that would be a
probability opposed to the prima facie evidence
which is to the detriment of the account holder. […]
35 (g) The plaintiff wrongly argues that the application
of the principles of the prima facie evidence by the
jurisdiction would result in cases of similar type in a
reversal of burden of proof and would provoke a
liability regardless of negligence or fault that is
similar to a guarantee because the bank customer
does not have the ability to reveal security leaks of
the system. According to settled case-law of the
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH)
this prima facie evidence does not lead to a reversal
of the burden of proof (BGHZ 100, 31, 34 with
further references). The bank has to adduce full
evidence that the cardholder has effected an
withdrawal in person or their gross negligence
made possible the abuse of the ec-card by an
unauthorized third party, if the cardholder shakes
the basis of the prima facie evidence with a detailed
description and if applicable with proof of the
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possibility of an atypical course of action. […]
III.
37 The revision of the plaintiff was rejected as
unfounded.
Commentary 
A savings bank can debit the funds withdrawn by the
card holder (or a third party authorized by the card
holder) from the card holder’s current account. Such
reimbursement of expenses is based upon Section 676h
of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch –
BGB). Section 676h BGB provides that:
Das Kreditinstitut kann Aufwendungsersatz für die
Verwendung von Zahlungskarten oder von deren
Daten nur verlangen, wenn diese nicht von einem
Dritten missbräuchlich verwendet wurden. Wenn der
Zahlungskarte nicht ein Girovertrag, sondern ein
anderer Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag zugrunde liegt,
gilt Satz 1 für den Kartenaussteller entsprechend.
The banking institution may only demand
reimbursement of expenses for use of payment cards
or of their data if the latter have not been abused by a
third party. If the payment card is not based on a
current account contract but another contract for the
management of the affairs of another, sentence 1
applies with the necessary modifications to the issuer
of the card.3
In the event of an unauthorized withdrawal with the aid
of an ec-card, the banking institution can take into
consideration a claim for damages. The grossly
negligent behaviour of the card holder regarding the
storage of the PIN or the ec-card or both may result in
the card holder’s liability towards the banking
institution. But in such a case, the banking institution
has to prove the card holder’s breach of the general
terms and conditions regarding the use of the ec-card.
The new 128-BIT-key system leads to a significant
higher security and makes it very improbable that the
PIN can be generated. Therefore the prima facie
evidence (prima facie evidence is a similar concept to a
presumption in English law) that the PIN and ec-card
were stored together or that the PIN was noted on the
ec-card is conceivable. In its general terms and
conditions the savings, the bank enumerated a number
of cases (they were not exhaustive) in which the card
holder’s behaviour is considered to be grossly
negligent, and the BGH considers these provisions are
valid.
For the future, it has to be discussed how the prima
facie evidence, which is formulated to the card holder’s
detriment, can be challenged in individual cases. In
practice it will be difficult for a card holder to
demonstrate that the PIN was not noted on or stored
together with the ec-card. The former will be impossible
if the card was stolen and cannot be shown. The court’s
confidence in the security of the encryption system
together with the validity of the general terms and
condition’s non-exhaustive list of what constituted
grossly negligent behaviour resulted in a
disadvantageous result for the consumer in this case.
© Commentary Dr. Martin Eßer, 2009
Further commentary on the German Federal
Court of Justice Judgement of October 5,
2004, Case XI ZR 210/03
By Dr. Thomas Kritter
Headnotes of the decision
1. If cash is withdrawn from an ATM shortly after theft
of an ec-card by using the stolen card and the
correct PIN, a prima facie presumption applies that
the card holder had noted the PIN on the card or
stored the PIN together with the card.
2. A sniffer attack on the PIN by a third person as an
alternative reason in principle only can be
considered if the ec-card has been stolen shortly
after the PIN had been entered into an ATM or PoS
terminal by the cardholder.
Facts of the case 
The plaintiff had a current account with the defendant, a
German savings bank. The bank had issued an EC-Card
with a personal identification number (PIN). According
3 This provision serves to implement Article 8 of
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of
consumers in respect of distance contracts OJ L144,
04/06/1997 P. 0019 - 0027.
Dr. Eßer is a member of the editorial board
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to the banks general terms and conditions, in case of
loss of the card, a card holder was in principle liable for
damages incurred before a notice of loss to the bank if
he or she had negligently infringed their duties of care.
However, the bank was prepared to indemnify the card
holder provided he had not infringed his duty of care
and was not grossly negligent. The general terms and
conditions stipulated that a case of gross negligence
was present in particular if the PIN was noted on the
card or has been stored together with the card.
On two consecutive days two amounts of DM 500 and
one amount of DM 1,000 were withdrawn before the
card was blocked on the third day. The card holder
claimed the card had been stolen at a local festival. She
alleged that she had neither written the PIN onto the
card nor stored the PIN together with the card. She
claimed that the thief must have deciphered the PIN or
must have taken advantage of defects in the security
mechanisms in place to keep the bank’s institutional
key secret. The amount withdrawn was debited to the
account. The card holder sued the bank for payment of
DM 2,000.00.
Background of the decision
Since the end of the 1990s, there have been a
considerable number of cases brought before the first
and second instance courts where card holders had
sued their banks for reimbursement of damages they
allegedly suffered from misuse of their stolen cards.
The final instance judgement concerned an EC-card.
The PIN of the card was protected by a Triple-DES 128-
Bit-Encryption. The case belongs to a group of cases
where it was argued that criminals must have been able
to decipher the PIN, as the plaintiffs alleged they had
adhered to their duties of care so that it was impossible
for a thief to get knowledge of the PIN. The banks in
such cases argued that it was impossible to decipher
the 128-Bit-Encryption by a brute force attack at that
point in time (around 2000).
In this situation, the majority of lower instance courts
applied a prima facie presumption that (i) either the
card holder had withdrawn the money or (ii) that a third
person, after theft of the card, was able to obtain
knowledge of the PIN because it had been kept together
with the card. Contrary to these decisions, a substantial
number of courts refused to apply such a prima facie
presumption. It should, however, be noted that a
number of these cases concerned the older DES-56-Bit-
Encryption (which is deemed to be vulnerable to brute
force attacks since the end of the 1990s).
Due to the relatively small amounts of money usually
involved, cases usually started at (lowest) district court
level (Amtsgericht with jurisdiction for claims until an
amount of 5,000.00 Euro) with the possibility to appeal
to the regional court (Landgericht) on facts and on law,
with the possibility for a further appeal only on
questions of law to the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof). Only a small number of cases
started at regional court level (claims above an amount
of 5,000.00 Euro) with the possibility to appeal on facts
and on law to the Higher Regional Court of Appeals
(Oberlandesgericht) with possibility of a further appeal
only on questions of law to the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof).
Ruling 
The Federal Court of Justice upheld the view of the
majority of German Courts that the banks in cases of
misuse of ec- and creditcards (using a 128-Bit-
Encryption) can rely on a prima facie presumption.
The Court held that if cash is withdrawn from an ATM
shortly after the theft of an ec-card by using the stolen
card and the correct PIN, a prima facie presumption
applies that the card holder had noted the PIN on the
card or stored the PIN together with the card. It further
held that a sniffer attack on the PIN by a third person as
an alternative reason in principle only can be considered
if the ec-card has been stolen shortly after the PIN had
been entered into an ATM or PoS terminal by the
cardholder.
According to the case law of the Federal Court of
Justice, a prima facie presumption can only be applied
where a fact to be proven is a typical occurrence in the
normal course of events, taking into account all the
undisputable and established circumstances of the
individual case. If a prima facie presumption does
establish causation, the opposing party can challenge
the presumption on the basis of facts which cast serious
doubt on whether a typical occurrence is involved.
The Federal Court of Justice as the final court of
appeal, had to rely on the findings of fact of the
Regional Court (Landgericht) as second instance court
in this case. The regional court, having considered an
expert opinion, came to the conclusion that even with
substantial financial efforts it would be mathematically
impossible to calculate the PIN on individual cards
using the data stored on the cards without having
deciphered the banks 128-Bit encrypted institutional
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key. Deciphering the bank’s institutional key by a ‘brute-
force-attack’ was regarded as impossible by the expert
heard by the regional court with regard to the Triple-
DES-128-Bit-Key at stake. Due to the fact that the
Federal Court of Justice only decides on questions of an
appeal in law, the court was restricted to examine
whether the lower court did appreciate all the evidence
without any contradiction. The Federal Court of Justice
did not find such mistakes in the appreciation of
evidence of the lower court.
The Federal Court of Justice further upheld the lower
court’s view that the mere theoretical possibility of an
insider attacks by persons concerned with the security
infrastructure in the banking sector is not sufficient to
deny a prima facie presumption.
Thus, a prima facie presumption applies, which leaves
the banks’ customers with the possibility to show that
the banking system is not necessarily secure. In this
regard, the court held that even though the burden for
challenging the prima facie presumption lies with the
customer, the bank might be obliged under the rules of
secondary burden to substantiate facts to provide
information on its security systems, taking into account
the interests of the bank to keep the detailed
infrastructure secret.
Reaction
The judgement was criticised in particular from
consumer organisations. It was argued that the lower
court had relied on an insufficient expert opinion, which
to a great extent was based on assumptions as the bank
had failed to provide the court’s expert with sufficient
facts as to the structure of PIN authentication system.
The judgement of the Federal Court of Justice was
contested in a recent case before the Higher Regional
Court of Appeal of Frankfurt. The plaintiff there, a
consumer organisation representing several cases,
argued that recent research had shown the 128-Bit-Key
was not safe. The trial concerned cases of card misuse
between December 1999 and February 2003. The Higher
Regional Court of Appeal of Frankfurt appointed a court
expert from the German Federal Office for Information
Security. Heaving heard the expert, the Higher Regional
Court of Appeal of Frankfurt shared the view of the
Federal Court of Justice, that for the time period in
question the Triple-DES-128-Bit encryption must be
regarded as safe. The court held that it seemed
practically impossible that criminals were able to
decipher a PIN of an ec-card by a brute force attack. The
court further referred to the fact that no case of an
insider attack has become known in public an thus
applied a prima facie presumption which the plaintiff
was not able to challenge (judgement of January 31,
2008, Case 23 U 28/05).
Conclusion
With its 2004 judgement, the Federal Court of Justice
decided a long drawn-out dispute between the lower
instance courts about the application of a prima facie
presumption in cases of ec- and credit card misuse, and
the assumption about the security of the PIN system.
The general discussion about security of the PIN and
the ec- and credit card system will certainly continue, as
the ruling of the Federal Court of Justice is based on
certain mathematical-technical assumptions which
might be contested in the future.
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